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UNESCO’s World Heritage Centre’s communication monopoly over nationally filtered 
heritage operates not in an apolitical past but in present politics. Working through the 
“World Heritage Order” and its changing definition of “outstanding universal value,” this 
article develops a bridge between seemingly disconnected rural sites in France and the 
People’s Republic of China to move beyond the confines of “imagined communities” and 
their potential for displacing “concrete inequalities.” The article extends a critical 
approach of communication to heritage and contextualizes present rural heritage 
communication within larger political economic and cultural processes of urban–rural and 
capital–capillary dynamics that enables, in the cases examined, their current heritage 
identity. 
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While engagements with old and new media—news, television, film, social media—are the norm, 
approaching the production of cultural heritage as a site of communication remains relatively uncharted. 
One of the possible reasons—and, simultaneously, results—of this is that cultural heritage is commonly 
understood as operating in the apolitical past tense, approached as historical fact, rather than within the 
present tense of politics, where it can be critically reproached for its ability to package political projects. 
Despite this understanding, the ongoing contestation over the use of cultural heritage, in everything from 
the deployment of historic maps as “weapons of mass cartography” in territorial claims to recent riots over 
Confederate statues in the United States, point toward the political and economic ramifications of the 
communication of cultural heritage.  With this in mind, the expanding global rural heritage industry and its 
articulation through UNESCO’s World Heritage Centre (WHC), the largest institutional player in the field, 
can be fruitfully explored from a communication perspective. 
 
This article enriches the “global to village” framework of this Special Section by avoiding a 
vertical line from a universal or global experience to a local or village-based experience by breaking from 
established identities and building a transcultural line from my home in rural Corsica, a French island, to 
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the rural site of Heyang in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This article critiques the capacity of 
distinct nationally filtered “imagined communities”in the way that Anderson (2006) describesin 
concealing past and present “concrete inequalities” in the communication of cultural heritage. Pursuing 
this end, this article extends a critical communication approach to the realm of heritage and engages the 
WHC’s global heritage regime’s changing definition of “outstanding universal value” (OUV). As I show, the 
definition of OUV has shifted to condense the normative valuation of cultural pedigree with economic 
interests by defining world heritage in terms of its access to global tourism. In exploring the WHC’s 
relationship to Corsica and the ways in which the WHC’s dominant discourse on heritage can be related to 
Heyang, this article argues that the identification of a universal cultural heritage displaces conflicts over 
inequality to the detriment of particular peasants. That is, as much as heritage development may bring 
with it opportunities its communication also brings with it unique challenges. The connections between 
Corsica and Heyang showcase not only the need for critical engagements with the communication of 
cultural heritage and the possibility for transcultural readings of heritage, but also questions the WHC’s 
celebration of heritage sites without also contextualizing their current preservation status as a product of 




This article draws from a tradition of critical communication research that offers a key framework 
in relating various levels of the “communication processes, both to each other and to the central 
dimensions of social structure and social processes” (Golding & Murdock, 1978, p. 354). As proposed by 
Golding and Murdock (1978, pp. 353–354), this is a three-pronged approach. First, it locates unequal and 
stratified distribution of communicative resources within larger patterns of economic inequality—in 
particular, locating the mass media along the axis of class understood as the central axis of stratification. 
Second, it addresses the issue of legitimation through communication by which these structures of 
inequality are naturalized as “common sense”—that is, how communication plays a role in the process of 
economic inequality being socially legitimated through cultural reproduction via media industries. Third, it 
foregrounds these social struggles of challenge and incorporation in the dialectical processes of social 
stratification, class polarization, and cultural displacement. 
 
In extending this framework to the media system in the PRC, Zhao (2008, pp. 6–7) highlights the 
more complex and challenging problems of media and cultural industries in legitimating inequality in a 
formerly self-proclaimed socialist country operating within a contested capitalist world system. Here deep 
contradictions between the “party line” of international communism and the “bottom line” of global and 
local commercial interests in a post-Mao China, which once espoused socialist ideals of social equality, are 
themselves in the process of incorporation by new socializing pressures (see also Zhao, 1998). This is 
embodied in how the country’s seemingly national-centric reform-era reorganization of its communication 
system are engaged as being part and parcel of a “neoliberal-oriented global restructuring of 
communication and culture, leading to the formation of a truly globalized communication system and the 
spread of the culture-ideology of consumerism” (Zhao, 2008, p. 150). While the work carries the torch of 
a critical approach to communication, it does not, similar to Golding and Murdock (1978), extensively 
engage the rural-urban dimension or extend this critique to heritage. 
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In this article, I extend this critical framework to the communication of rural heritage to 
demonstrate how the communication processes involved in imagining communities, embodied in a 
depoliticized communication of heritage, can legitimate national inequality. This article responds to the call 
for creativity embodied in Laclau and Mouffe’s (2001) concept of “chain of equivalence,” whereby 
equivalently disadvantaged struggles can be weaved together. After all, operating within the 
“commonsense” approach to national frameworks of cultural heritage is to legitimate, returning to Golding 
and Murdock (1978), the larger social and economic inequality their communication may naturalize.  
 
This article argues that in some cases the communication of cultural heritage is not only 
predicated on past and present structures of inequality but also contributes to the legitimation of 
inequality. In the cases of rural cultural heritage, their preservation, establishment, management, and 
promotion involve contested webs of international economic core/periphery capital relations, centrifugal 
flows of information and intranational normative cultural-linguistic monopolies determined by urban 
cultural capitalsthat is, capital in the geospatial sense, the economic-financial sense, and the cultural 
sense, which can be understood in shorthand as the language of capital(s). Specifically, the ability to 
articulate in a professional high-register “standard” language is a product of complex urban political 
dynamics that subordinates “substandard” rural expressions under a polarizing cultural process. Within the 
larger realm of communication and culture, rural cultural heritage is also a site of struggle over the 
imagined community. 
 
Anderson (2006) developed the concept of imagined community to describe the sociomaterial 
processes that led to the possibility of the relatively new concept of the nation understood in terms of a 
limited community. The nation is imagined as limited, because “even the largest of them encompassing 
perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic boundaries, beyond which lie other nations” (p. 
7). The nation is imagined as a community because “regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation 
that may prevail” (p. 7) it is conceived as a deep horizontal comradeship. As Anderson argues, the relative 
philosophical poverty and outright incoherence of nationalism, whose imagined antiquity relies as much on 
selective remembering as on active forgetting, does little to hinder its “political” power evident in how 
many people willfully die for such a limited imagination (pp. 6–7). 
 
For Anderson (2006), these communities were made imaginable by the explosive interaction 
between “a system of production and productive relations (capitalism), a technology of communication 
(print), and the fatality of human linguistic diversity” (pp. 42–43). During this time, corroborating histories 
and museums emerged that communicated discrete “imagined communities” as descendants from ancient 
heritage (p. 6). During these processes, previous vernacular languages geographically close to centers of 
power, such as those used in state administration, were transformed to “standard” print languages of 
power (p. 45). 
 
Here, communication resources are key to (re)producing imagined communities operating within 
larger patterns of economic and social inequality. Drawing parallels to Golding and Murdock (1978), the 
macrolevel politics of access to communication are reembodied at the microlevel politics that collapses 
social stratification under a projected universal common—in this case, an identified imagined community. 
Situating this within an urban–rural dynamic, those not in control of communication nodal points, 
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particularly those distant from media centers in the countryside, can be understood as being subsumed 
under centralizing conceptual identities. 
 
One possible alternative to the capacity for imagined community to displace the centrality of 
social struggle would, following Laclau and Mouffe (2001), operate through “chains of equivalence” 
between equivalently disadvantaged cases across communities. Against “commonsense” categorizations of 
difference, Laclau and Mouffe (2001) note that while struggles may take on different forms, each of which 
may at first seem to be distant in terms of content, they nonetheless may have a positional formal 
equivalency in terms of being disadvantaged by existing centers of power. In building a chain of 
equivalence between these differences, each link can remain distinct in its uniqueness but nonetheless 
brought together to formulate a new conceptual whole. Applied specifically to rural heritage, the possibility 
for progressive politics operates in changing inherited ontologies provided by the language of capital(s) by 
moving outside of that which is given—to move beyond the imagined limit. This is achieved by creating a 
chain between equivalent—not identical—rural struggles. That is, the critique from particular experiences 
of inequality in rural capillaries vis-à-vis centralizing urban-biased development can be weaved together to 
formulate a systemic critique of the communication of heritage identity. 
 
From Anderson’s nation-centered rendition of imagined communities, the rise of the 
“transnational capitalist class” (Robinson, 2004) and existence of “transnational agrarian movements” (see 
Borras, Edelman, & Kay, 2008) point toward the articulation of what can be called a “transnational 
peasant class.” This requires, at the very least, a rejection of confined cultural identities to lay the 
formation of transculturally “equivalent” connections. For Robinson (2004), the transnational capitalist 
class is transnational because it is tied to “globalized circuits of production, marketing, and finances 
unbound from particular national territories and identities” (p. 47). While Robinson focuses on the 
contextual beneficiaries of such a world system, an alternative can be imagined from below that is tied to 
corresponding disadvantaged positions within the language of capital(s). In other words, rural Corsica can 
be used, not as a cultural particularity within the imagined community framework of the “French” national 
lens—or even through a civilizational lens—but as a link in a chain with other rural spaces outside of 
established conceptual cultural continuities. 
 
To pursue such a path requires a creative critique of “commonsense” cultural boundaries that act 
as forms of containment to “construct what is beyond the limits” (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 144). An 
example of this can be seen in Michèle Lalonde’s 1967 Canadian poem “Speak White.” The piece, named 
after an Anglophone racist slur against “white looking” speakers of non-English languages within Canada, 
critiques heritage narratives and commandeers established nodal points of identity communication. The 
poem, written in a primarily Francophone-speaking Quebec but where media and industry were in the 
hands of Anglophones (see Mezei, 1998), claimed equivalence not only among those who were 
contextually poor, due to the uneven expansion and redistribution of capital, but poorly articulated 
themselves in a given cultural capital’s “standard language” due to their peripheral, “un-cultured,” status. 
In the poem, the relatively “poor” Quebecers are shown to be “cultured” by Anglophones through their 
access to English heritage and consumer products—the Magna Carta and the significance of “crumpets”—
while simultaneously recognizing that English is the language laborers primarily use to communicate with 
their employers. 
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Here, the use of English signals both the “high” of cultural capital and simultaneously the “low” 
paying corporeality of economic capital flows: One is hired, fired, and cultured in English. Working against 
this, the poem resists how socioeconomic peripheries are not only affected by the movement of economic 
capital, but also interpolated under prioritized cultural systems of meaning in which they cannot properly 
respond. The poem ends with a creative chain of equivalence connecting Quebec to Watts and Algeria—
crashing through scripted cultural identities and uncovering an alternative community in claiming “we are 
not alone” (Lalonde, 1974). Here, while each individual struggle may be different, their positional 
relationship within larger social structures provides a kernel of equivalence. Here embodied is an 
alternative comradeship to the identification of community promoted by dominant forms of heritage. In 
the poem, the goal is not to simply make a new economic and cultural capital but instead weave struggles 
against the language of capital(s). This rejects the capital-centric production of heritage identity and its 
formal capacity to ignore political alternatives and displace capillary experiences through a communication 
of objectivity writing singularity over multitudes of difference. Drawing from this, we can move beyond 
engagements of nationally filtered “French” or “Chinese” culture and instead locate how the constitution of 
culture operates within struggles over the establishment and communication of rural heritage. 
 
The World Heritage Order and the Management of Outstanding Universal Values 
 
Growing out of the sense of change and loss by two world wars and global modernization, 
UNESCO’s World Heritage Convention glamorizes a nation’s heritage as its “most important and priceless 
possessions” (UNESCO, 1977a, p. 1). It appeared during a period of both deep global cultural and 
neoliberal political-economic change (Harvey, 2003) and the rise of global tourism (Harrison, 2013). With 
the World Heritage Centre’s list recently swelling to more than 1,000 sites, the WHC has established itself 
as the major player in what DiGiovine (2009), drawing from Appadurai (1996), identifies as the heritage-
scape—a globalizing process that works with states to create individual heritage sites through selection 
criteria. With the increasing commoditization of this criteria, as this article later describes, it may be that 
while the entrances to WHC sites are located in different states, one always exits through the gift shop—
which, as DiGiovine notes, extends to the valorization of nearby businesses, from bed and breakfasts to 
brothels. 
 
The WHC’s changing identification of OUV, the key component to receiving heritage status, 
showcases the need to engage heritage critically. From its basis in the 1972 heritage convention, the WHC 
has shifted from Spartan preservation goals to being deeply implicated in the nature of the 
communication, management, and integration of national heritage sites to global tourism networks. Within 
this context, “Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention” (OG) is 
the major institutional mechanism of syncing with these changes, responding to the 1980s “heritage 
industry” boom (Hewison, 1987) and its globalization over the period of the 1990s to 2000s (Harrison, 
2013).  
 
The OG has changed dramatically since its first 1977 iteration, shifting from world heritage 
preservation to world tourism promotion, evident with the increasing demands for authenticity (UNESCO, 
1994), “management conservation” (UNESCO, 1997), and the participation of business stakeholders 
(UNESCO, 2005) as well as the explicit awareness of tourist pressures on site conservation (UNESCO, 
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2008). Arguably, the representative kernel of this progression is located in the changing definition of OUV 
between the 1987 and 1988 OG, where marketability is directly tied to the definition of OUV, becoming 
the Trojan horse that injects various tourism and management demands articulated elsewhere in WHC 
policy to its core identity. 
 
In the first OG, the “universal” requirement for OUV is interpreted simply as a property that is 
highly representative of the culture in question (see UNESCO, 1977b). This definition expanded later that 
year (UNESCO, 1977c) to recognize OUV in sites with one of the following traits: 
 
1. Represent a unique artistic or aesthetic achievement, a masterpiece of the creative 
genius; or 
 
2. Have exerted considerable influence, over a span of time or within a cultural area of 
the world, on subsequent developments in architecture, monumental sculpture, 
garden and landscape design, related arts, or human settlements; or 
 
3. Be unique, extremely rare, or of great antiquity; or 
 
4. Be among the most characteristic examples of a type of structure, the type 
representing an important cultural, social, artistic, scientific, technological or 
industrial development; or  
 
5. Be a characteristic example of a significant traditional style of architecture, method 
of construction, or human settlement, that is fragile by nature or has become 
vulnerable under the impact of irreversible sociocultural or economic change; or  
 
6. Be most importantly associated with ideas or beliefs, with events or with persons, of 
outstanding historical important or significance. (UNESCO, 1977c, p.3) 
 
Against this cultural definition, 1988 is a key year for the emerging global heritage industry 
evident in new requirements. From 1977’s ancillary need for applications to simply describe the state and 
means of preservationlegal, administrative, financial, and so onthe 1988 OG requires a site to meet 
one of the original requirements for OUV and  
 
have adequate legal and/or contractual and/or traditional protection and management 
mechanisms to ensure the conservation of the nominated cultural properties or cultural 
landscapes. The existence of protective legislation at the national, provincial or 
municipal level and/or a well-established contractual or traditional protection as well as 
of adequate management and/or planning control mechanisms is therefore essential 
and, as is clearly indicated in the following paragraph, must be stated clearly on the 
nomination form. Assurances of the effective implementation of these laws and/or 
contractual and/or traditional protection as well as of these management mechanisms 
are also expected. Furthermore, to preserve the integrity of cultural sites, particularly 
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those open to large numbers of visitors, the State Party concerned should be able to 
provide evidence of suitable administrative arrangements to cover the management of 
the property, its conservation and its accessibility to the public. (UNESCO, 1988, section 
24.b.ii, emphasis mine) 
 
This new definition of OUV requires a site to be outstanding both culturally and economically, 
requiring a management mandate for accessibility not only for world heritage status but to tourism 
capital. The requirement is not expressed as an additive, a protective apparatus ensuring the integrity of 
the value, but is inscribed into its very identity as the core definition of the value itself. With this new 
definition, only sites manageable and marketable instrumentally are recognized for possible OUV. Here, 
we can see where the interests of cultural capital transmute to economic capital. The normative collapse 
between what is considered heritage and how it is managed creates the DNA of today’s WHC, which, given 
its control over the key nodal point of articulation, at once internalizes private economic interests while 
interpolating the imagined community at the global level through its articulation of world heritage. 
 
Given the prestige of the WHC’s heritage regime and the absence of any global institutional 
alternative, the WHC can be understood as being the key player in the “World Heritage Order.” Although 
the term has been used in disparate contexts (see Hayward, 1996; Meskell & Brumann, 2015), the World 
Heritage Order can be understood from a communication perspective as signaling the WHC’s control over 
the global identity of world heritage. As I have shown, this carries with it cultural and economic 
imperatives. Acting as an international platform that relies on member states to submit sites for review, 
the WHC’s integral role in communicating old cultural heritage is firmly part and parcel of present politics. 
At the very least, the communication of world heritage, be it identified in rural France or rural PRC, brings 
with it more than simple concrete conservation for imagined communities. 
 
Communicating Corsica: Pristine Forests or Forlorn Poverty? 
 
France’s Corsica, a small Mediterranean island and part of my own “heritage,” provides an 
arresting example of how its current heritage properties, as identified by the WHC specifically and tourists 
more broadly, is predicated on historic structured economic poverty. Unlike references to heavily 
mediatized economic and cultural capitals, capitularies on the “dependency road” (Smythe, 1981) such as 
Corsica, require contextualization before they can become “citable.” In short, like other primarily rural 
spaces, Corsica’s complex history and the current nature heritage tourism boom never make it to 
mainstream readings of globalization. 
 
Before the 1884 Berlin Conference, where European centers of power divided global peripheries, 
Europe’s city-centers partitioned what would later become regional peripheries. This is evident in the brief 
existence of the Corsican state expressed in its 1755 constitution that was written postliberation and 
considered a first with women’s suffrage. It was repealed when the island was sold by Genoa to France, 
which subsequently invaded the island. This prompted the Enlightenment thinker Voltaire to question 
whether one people has the right to sell another (see Antonetti 1990, p. 370). 
 
4548  Joseph Nicolai International Journal of Communication 11(2017) 
The ensuing French rule was violently repressive, and Corsica fell prey to larger colonial 
structures (Antonetti, 1990). Economically, by the 19th century, half of the bread consumed was 
imported, and by World War II, Corsica imported most of its products. Racist policy implementation is 
evident during World War I, when 10% of the population was conscripted, in stark contrast to the French 
average of 3.5%. Unlike other French departments, from 1881 to 1962, the island “lost” half of its 
population. Culturally, the Corsican language was historically forbidden in schools, with signs in 1914 
banning its speech (Vergé-Franceschi, 2005, p. 495). The suturing of the gap between the language’s 
historic spatial reality within France and its social recognition as part of France’s heritage did not happen 
until a 2008 Constitutional amendment that officially identified, 219 years after France’s invasion, the 
Corsican language as an official part of France’s national heritage. However, given the island’s distance 
from access to prestigious nodal points within the language of capital(s), these processes have not been 
able to have been expressed through an authorized heritage as powerful as that expressed through France 
vis-à-vis other states. 
 
This historical process has enabled the island’s current identification as having preserved 
“natural” forests and heritage villages that today fuels tourism to the island, leading the official website for 
tourism in France to describe it simply as “a preserved island” (see Au.france.fr, n.d.). Read critically, the 
historic distance from the direct benefits of industrialization and the vast deterritorialization of residents 
has enabled its current consumable value. However, this encroaching commercialization and its inherent 
social stratification is being contested. This contestation can be seen in the very creation of the Parcù di 
Corsica (“Regional Natural Park of Corsica”) which at once acts as a bulwark against current capitalistic 
pressures over constructing private resorts and walling off beaches as well as a practical solution to the 
complexity of property claims as a result of depopulation. Covering 40% of the island, sections of the 
park, such as the Gul of Porto (comprising the Calanche of Piana, Gulf of Girolata, Scandola Reserve), 
were soon listed to the WHC in 1983. However, this conservation victory was not without its historic and 
ongoing price. 
 
The influx of legions of tourists and vacation homes has brought about ongoing resistance to 
forms of marketization that marginalizes alternative developmental paths evident in a protracted struggle 
taking place on many fronts on the island. One of these fronts has been the active bombing campaign 
against tourist infrastructures (Perrier, 1971). Between 1975 and 1982 alone, there were 2,967 bombings 
in Corsica—all without casualty—primarily targeting tourism infrastructure (Vergé-Franceschi, 2005, p. 
505). While Corsica’s pastoral beauty is communicated as “world heritage” by the WHC, its “history of 
pain” of its primarily peasant population, a key dialectical moment in its historical stratified rural 
relationship to urban centers, is displaced not only by WHC’s official site description but also, more 
broadly, by readings of nation-centric world system analyses. That is, on the one hand, its historically 
peripheral status within the language of capital(s) has “preserved” the island in a way for its current value 
for tourism, and, on the other hand, in this pivot toward communicating this new value, the history of 
structured rural immiseration is displaced. 
 
Against such imagined community and its ability to collapse social struggles, the nonidentified 
within the current WHC identifications of Corsica’s “pristine forests,” that which is not communicated in its 
heritage, is the tragedy of regional structured poverty. Here and elsewhere, contextually disadvantaged 
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spaces such as Corsica operate on the rural periphery of the so-called West showcase an experience not of 
the Other “out there,” but of the anterior within—the uncanny exploitative economic and cultural systems 
showcasing a fundamental nonidentity of current conceptualizations of Western identity. Understood 
through the language of capital(s), the prioritization of a particular imagined community over particular 
difference—where economic and cultural modes in the countrysides are displaced as a country’s side—do 
not voice rural peripheries and points toward a signified West not concomitant with the complexity evident 
in the West itself. This problematizes simplistic models of world-system analysis by not only provincializing 
the West concept as an ontological whole vis-à-vis other perceived wholes (see Chakrabarty, 2000) but 
pastoralizing the concept of onto-itself by grounding it within urban–rural dynamics. It is from this context 
the rural can be approached as displaced under urban-centric economic and cultural orderings under the 
stratification of the language of capital(s) that, returning to Golding and Murdock (1978), (re)constitute 
ideological legitimation through communication nodes by which social structures of inequality are 
reinforced. 
 
The Counter-Cultural Revolution in the Great Leap Backward 
 
Before exploring a creative chain of equivalence from rural Corsica to rural China, this article will 
provide background to the “cultural” side of the PRC’s reintegration to the global economy via its ongoing 
reidentification of the political foundations of the its authorized heritage and its ensuing effects on the 
rural. The politics of apolitical engagements with cultural pedigree are particularly salient in the PRC, 
where state-sponsored memory plays a conspicuous role in navigating the dual demands of communist 
legacies and current economic pressures (Zhao, 1998). This disjunction is embodied in analysis of the 
PRC’s relationships to global institutions that generally ignore the PRC-WHC dynamic (see Johnston, 2008; 
Kent, 2007) and work claiming to critically engage the country’s heritage politics can disregard 
revolutionary legacies (see Blumenfield & Silverman, 2013). 
 
From the May 4 movement to the Cultural Revolution, the territory we now call China has had a 
history of critiquing heritage as a site of politics. Lu Xun, a key figure in the 1919 May 4 movement, 
argued that defenses of cultural heritage were complicit with sustaining exploitative power relations 
(Chow, 1960). By applying a genealogical approach to discourse, whereby the “pedigree” of the 
communication of heritage is questioned on its own historical terms, he argued that only the ontological 
form of an eternal “Chinese civilization” remains unchanging in the passage of time while its actual 
“content” shifts to the rhythms of ruling regimes. As Lu Xun puts it, in the history of “China,” when 
“barbarians” became “rulers”—a new elite taking over the nodal point of authorized heritage 
communication—scholars discovered that these “‘barbarians’ [were] also the descendants of the Yellow 
Emperor” (see Chow, 1960, pp. 310–311). That is, while the category of China remained the same, in 
terms of actual content, each ruling force, many of which were at one time deemed to be “foreign,” were 
in turn incorporated within the heritage narrative of the imagined community in question to further 
legitimate the status quo. 
 
This critical approach to cultural heritage was renewed in the PRC’s emergence when it mobilized 
media to inverse “traditional hierarchies” by recognizing the importance of peasants in society (Zhao, 
2008). At the same time, the country officially pursued inclusive industrialization without urbanization 
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(Zhu, 1999). This spirit was reemployed during the Cultural Revolution of 1966–76 when cultural heritage 
was reproached as a roadblock to progress. That is, the continuation of traditions of injustice, such as 
cultural chauvinism, patriarchy, and other forms of bondage, were criticized as standing in the way of 
modern social progress. 
 
Against this, the 1978 economic “open door” policy brought with it a counter-Cultural Revolution 
that prioritized urban development while cultural discourse began challenging class-based appellations. 
Gradually, heritage-tourism as a cultural and economic industry was promoted given its high returns on 
relatively low investment (Li, Y. & Hu, 2008). By the late 1990s, far from mobilizing media to promote the 
importance of peasants, new campaigns propagated an identity of “cultural traditions” (Dynon, 2008) that 
ran parallel to apolitical urban-based normative concepts of quality (Yang, 2007). Here a new imagined 
community was communicated at the moment when economic reform fostered social upheaval. That is, on 
the one hand, new relations to global and regional centers of capital transformed the countryside, while, 
on the other hand, this transformation was culturally legitimated by interpolating rural dissent through the 
communication of a normative urban-centered discourse. 
 
In this context the PRC joined the WHC “late” in 1985. However, by 2015, despite high costs of 
readying sites for application, the country quickly became a global heritage leader. Despite this boom, 
without a single PRC communist site listed with the WHC, the PRC-WHC dynamic displaces communist 
legacies—a feat achieved by provincializing the “international communism” at the heart of the PRC’s 
constitution by communicating an identified “world cultural heritage” under WHC auspices. That is, while 
there exists a burgeoning nationally recognized “red heritage” tourism industry (Li, Y. & Hu, 2008), none 
of these sites have yet to be chosen to apply to the WHC. While there is obvious pride in the idea of 
cultural heritage, there is also prejudice in terms of what makes it to the world stage, embodying a schism 
between the PRC’s revolutionary history and its recognition through the WHC. Integral to this process is 
the ongoing uneven market expansion that has rendered villages by transforming peasants in to “semifree 
commodities” able to work primarily in urban economic centers. For Qiu (2010, p. 531), this enormous 
migrant-peasant labor force is the source for the highly mediatized urban-based success narratives that 
are predicated on rural demise. The extent of the resulting rural transformation has created an ironic 
situation where, following Žižek (2011, p. 714), the oppressive power of the Cultural Revolution’s Red 
Guards who destroy ancient monuments pales in comparison to the “success” of capitalism in 
dismembering both traditional social relations and material history. As Žižek claims, China’s shift between 
modernizing without urbanization to an urban-oriented modernization is embodied in the transition from 
the Great Leap Forward, with its development slogan “an iron foundry in every village,” to today’s new 
capitalist Great Leap Forward, embodied in Žižek’s (2011, p. 718) tongue-in-cheek description as “a 
skyscraper on every street.” 
 
While the PRC’s emerging manufacturing centers chased the “hard” development dragon to the 
detriment of their heritage resources, replacing the old with the new, some rural spaces, facing both 
depopulation as peasants moved to cities as well as deprivation from large-scale development, retained 
what would later become their current “cultural” real estate. Similar to Corsica, historic depopulation 
coupled with distance from economic redistribution created the context for today’s rise of cultural heritage 
value. In these cases, historic rural poverty, in short, is a predicate for heritage quality. In the PRC 
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context, today many of these “untouched” villages are being brought in to tourist-heritage networks as 
different levels of government promote their venues by investing in “authentic” WHC-style repairs as 
urban intellectuals seek legitimacy and profits in their interpretation of Chinese cultural nostalgia (see Wu, 
2015, p. 31; Qian, this Special Section). 
 
It is within this complex ongoing process, which can be described as a “Great Leap Backward” 
toward heritage, that a critical communication approach is particularly poignant. This is apparent in the 
first instances of primarily rural sites in the PRC being submitted to the WHC. After the PRC signed on to 
the WHC, Shanxi Province’s Pingyao was awarded OUV and received UNESCO approval in 1997 “due to its 
well-preserved city layout, city wall, and architectural excellence” (Wang, 2011, p. 18). While during the 
late Qing Dynasty, Pingyao prospered and housed many financial institutions, it became one of the 
country’s poorest areas in the 1950s to 1990s. During this time, what we would now call “heritage 
buildings”—many built for banking elites—were redistributed among the poor. While Pingyao’s 
precommunist survival rested on the banking network and fortified walls, it is its poverty that prevented it 
following a pattern of development that would have led to the demise of its “heritage qualities.” 
 
The “universal value” of heritage, which makes up the “most precious asset of a nation” 
according to WHC logic, was not universally acclaimed by residents when identified in Pingyao. Claims of 
authenticity were employed to evict peasants living in subdivisions established during the Cultural 
Revolution. While Pingyao received world heritage status from above, a segment of locals were displaced 
from below. With “expert advice,” the local government sought to “relocate 20,000 Pingyao residents so 
that the crowded old city may retain its authenticity,” admitting in the same breath that, while residents 
fully support the relocation plan, “their finances do not permit buying the more spacious houses in the 
new city” (W. Li, 2003, para. 12). The form of OUV in the heritage communicated was one that quite 
literally displaced the social struggle faced on the ground. Who, after all, would work against world 
heritage? 
 
These complexities are embodied in the difficulties revolving around the fact that those who resist 
the incursions of heritage can be read as not only working to resist “world heritage” and OUV but also a 
normatively “harmonious” vision of imagined community for nationally identified sites. In so doing, they 
wage their participation in a normative “imagined identity” by resisting an industry working against their 
wages. In the Pingyao case, instead of communicating the issue in terms of social justice, the preservation 
status of heritage takes precedence: The elitist heritage communicated rectifies the “mistake” of land 
redistribution (see Nicolai, 2013). Here revolutionary history is displaced to reconstruct a vision that is, in 
both form and content, inimical to both communist legacies and, in some cases, the interests of residents. 
Moreover, within the counter-Cultural Revolution context, the history of Pingyao’s merchants, who were 
framed as exploiters during the height of communist historiography, are being reintegrated within the 
PRC’s heritage as being precursors to contemporary “opening up” economic reform (see Kong, 2010). 
 
In cases following this “Pingyao Model” (Nicolai, 2013), the identified essence of the PRC’s 
cultural heritage is managed to displace communist legacies as merely accidental cultural deviance—
following a “rectifying” institutional trend where once purged figures, from “capitalist roaders” like Liu 
Shaoqi to “historical figures” like Confucius, are officially rehabilitated postreform. However, this counter-
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Cultural Revolution is incomplete given that communist legacies form the Chinese Communist Party’s 
legitimizing political foundations (Zhao, 2008), illustrating a struggle between the “vampiric” logic of 
depoliticized communication of heritage, that sucks the “red” out of social struggles, and the unfulfilled 
communist promises of social justice, which enable what can be called a dream of the red horizon that 
haunts contestation over the nature of heritage communication within the PRC. This apolitical heritage 
development contradicts the relatively recent rise of “red heritage” within PRC. Today communist heritage 
is increasingly exploited, both economically and politically, as embodied in Yan’an and other revolutionary 
sties (see Li, Y. & Hu, 2008). The tensions between apolitical communication of heritage and its political 
revolutionary alternative provide a site of struggle over the identity of heritage within the country. 
 
The Heart of Heyang: Rural Reservations, Restrictions, and Renovations 
 
As part of an international research team (see Zhao, this Special Section), I participated in 
interviews with locals in the village of Heyang, located in Zhejiang Province, to study the village’s nascent 
heritage industry. I found that, similar to Corsica, historic relational poverty allowed for the village’s 
current ripeness for WHC-style heritage tourism. While the peculiarities may be different between Corsica 
and Heyang, the ongoing struggles under the language of capital(s) are similar. While not a world heritage 
site, the WHC regime’s normative framework can be seen as working through a domestic hierarchical 
Chinese regime, from the nation’s capital, Beijing, down to Zheijang’s provincial capital, Hangzhou, all the 
way to Jinyun County’s Heyang, expressed through the nexus of the Jinyun County Heyang Ancient-
Dwellings Protection and Development Management Committee. 
 
The interviews revealed that, while there is a consensus that heritage must be protected, there 
was no consensus on what cultural heritage is, let alone how to protect it. This was complicated by a 
struggle between an active resistance to an encroaching identification of heritage inimical to some 
interests and an active promotion of heritage by those seeking the development of the local heritage 
industry for their own benefit. As Heyang gained its status as a nationally protected rural heritage site, the 
local government has been increasing its demands, following the generally universalized WHC OG 
guideline for safeguarding authenticity by requiring extensive and expensive renovations. Here there was 
active resistance toward what villagers perceived to be the communication of a heritage that would be 
disadvantageous to their lives. Some interviewed complained that these policy demands for “authentic 
repairs” of the identified heritage translated in their difficulty to afford them.1 While a plan is in place for 
the local government to pay the lion’s share of the repairs, Hong and Liu, both in their late 60s, lamented 
that they could not use cheaper and more efficient modern alternatives to home improvement that would 
better their daily lives. With regard to public roads, some seniors, among them Hong, complained that the 
stone roads, as authentic as they may be, are very dangerous to walk on. In one of the direst cases, Ms. 
Ma, in her early 70s, explained that if rains, she has to use an umbrella at home because of the broken—
but nonetheless authentic—roof. She also lamented that the state of the house has been a point of 
contention within the family, with her two sons refusing to visit her until she sells it. One man in his 40s, 
Mr. Cao, when asked about his views on heritage replied in the local language that he wished “cultural 
heritage in the village would simply die.” 
                                                 
1 Pseudonyms have been used to maintain participants’ anonymity. 
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Arguably the views expressed here are not simple philistinism—a misinterpreted example of 
Marx’s “idiocy of rural life”—but rather a genuine isolation against a culture being identified against lived 
interests. It is not that the people interviewed who were critical of cultural heritage lacked “aesthetic 
sensibility” but, from a communication perspective, were isolated from many aspects of the means and 
ends of the pursuit of heritage and have enough sense to be able recognize whether what is identified is 
inimical to their interests. For a minority in Heyang, the road to dispossession—from both cultural 
imagined community and concrete practical housing—is paved with heritage development. For others, 
however, whose position enables them to benefit from the development of the community’s cultural 
heritage, the process is championed in terms of a commercially viable cultural renaissance. 
 
In such cases, heritage requirements such as “authentic repairs” can act in what has been 
defined in another context as a form of “accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey, 2003, pp. 162) or, more 
specifically, an ironic “accumulation through outstanding universal value” where the language of the 
commons is employed at the very moment when not only dispossessing local inhabitants but also 
displacing past histories of structured poverty. In this way, the arrival of “universal heritage” works 
similarly to the arrival of the free flow of globalizing ICT in the village, where new technology expected to 
connect residents to the network society dams local information outlets by ejecting them from relevant 
information on the “local political sphere” and injecting them to the “global public sphere” (see also Hauck, 
this Special Section). While some contextually benefit from the cultural heritage industry at play, the most 
disadvantaged portion of the peasants are treated as passive onlookers under either cosmopolitan media 
systems or a universal heritage—a position from which they are unable to properly respond. 
 
Returning to the complex history of the PRC, local resistance in Heyang would have taken a 
different turn if an alternative heritage were identified. What was identified as heritage in the village 
revolved primarily around historic buildings in the village rather than a peasant-oriented revolutionary 
reading of its own history. While slogans, such as “opposing contemporary revisionism” written in red 
along a wall, still exist and were counted as heritage among some villagers, they did nothing to prevent 
the ongoing practice of revisionism in the village in the rearticulating of the village’s heritage identity 
through the nexus of the heritage management committee. In this case, the struggles of the most 
disadvantaged are compounded by the nature of what is communicated as their heritage. After all, do 
these heritage plans consider the red graffiti, written during the Cultural Revolution along the walls of 
Heyang, as essential to the new preservation project, or will they be, like Pingyao subdivisions, removed 
in the name of OUV and cultural authenticity? 
 
In brief, the Jinyun County Heyang Ancient-Dwellings Protection and Development Management 
Committee and its relative control over the communication of heritage, leaving a communist reading of 
the past presents an unarticulated remainder. Here, the control over the communication of heritage not 
only affects the outcome with regard to the political symbolism of what is remembered, and with it, in 
turn, the (re)production of common sense, but the method of remembrance affects locals materially. 
Here, a key nodal point in the communication of authorized heritage has shifted hands from a communist 
articulation to a cultural articulation of heritage identity. If this were not the case, these residents could 
use this communist identification as an aegis against capitalizing claims of “common” cultural heritage. To 
complicate things further, as Zhang (this Special Section) mentions, the cultural vision of historic Heyang 
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life as having been good for locals revolves around its own imperial connections and rural exploitation of 
nearby contextually poorer areas. In other words, the memories of the “good life” recall its status as a 
landlord village in a contextually beneficiary position, both economically and culturally, under the language 
of capital(s). 
 
Similar to Corsica, in Heyang, the language of capital(s) plays an important role—linguistically, 
economically, and culturally—in the identification, capitalization, and communication of heritage. 
Economically, workers from other rural areas have been brought to Heyang, creating a stratified rural-to-
rural migrant workforce who are hired by the local government for construction work in the village 
because locals were seen as not having the necessarily expertise to restore their own homes to Heyang 
heritage standards. Culturally, the general consensus in the village—that heritage must be protected—
made it difficult for some to formulate criticisms against the way in which the identified heritage 
negatively affected them. Linguistically, the reproduction of unequal power relations is reinforced through 
the use of a normative standard language that is epitomized in the high registers employed to 
communicate the value of heritage while their very access to this value is threatened materially. This is 
evident in the fact that many peasants did not bother to read the large banner along a key road in the 
village stating that “cultural artifacts are nonrenewable cultural resources” (文物是不可再生的文化资源). 
During interviews, Mr. Dong, a farmer in his 50s, commented that the key terms of the banner employed 
prestigious language rarely used in daily life that only compounded the general alienation felt in the village 
between the residents and the local government. This distance is doubled in the context of the state 
sponsoring the “common speech” (普通话) as the imagined community’s standard language while Ms. He, 
Ms. Wu, and Mr. Xing, all in their late 60s to early 70s, revealed in interviews that when they were 
children they were instructed by their teachers to refrain from speaking their own local language at home 
on pain of punishment. As in Lalonde’s poem, one can see how if one cannot fully articulate oneself in the 
professional “standard language,” whose very standardization is embedded within larger socioeconomic 
processes, one cannot fully participate within a predetermined public sphere. 
 
In sum, the productive difference between the conceptual identity of cultural heritage and its 
concrete material consequences works against some of the peasants. Like a vampire, the communication 
of cultural heritage identification in this case sucks the communist rhetorical archives that could have been 
used as a political response to social struggle. In its place, the universalizing language of the cultural 
commons was employed to evict not only current particular peasants but also structured historic 
inequality, leaving in its wake the kernel of a socially stratifying OUV. 
 
Concluding a (Paper) Tiger’s Leap 
 
What brings these seemingly disparate rural sites in communion is how their current heritage 
communication is predicated on both the normalization of historic inequalities and the displacement of 
present social struggles. The conditions that enabled Heyang’s current heritage qualities are predicated on 
its historic pre-Mao powerful status vis-à-vis other nearby rural areas (see Zhang, this Special Section), a 
contextually advantageous position that disintegrated during the post-Mao period, when Heyang’s lack of 
development enabled its current preservation qualities. The nature of these heritage developments has 
brought with it new social struggles. The conditions that enabled Corsica’s current heritage and nature 
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tourism boom rest, to a large extent, on its contextual historic poverty and historical depopulation. The 
spread of vacation homes on its “untouched” property and the extent of its nationally protected forest are 
predicated, in short, on historical poverty. This has brought with it an extensive social struggle embodied 
in ongoing local resistance. In this way, the WHC-style celebration of cultural heritage in the rural sites 
examined can be approached as conceding to past and present economic and cultural displacement. From 
this perspective, the WHC’s dynamic privileges one part of this process in its uncontested cultural 
celebration. However, are not Corsica’s pristine heritage parks also the result of structural poverty? Is not 
the cultural legacy of Heyang also a contested case within the language of capital(s)? 
 
Walter Benjamin (2000) famously described a critical engagement with history in terms of a 
“tiger’s leap” into the past able to reroute future-oriented development by relaunching historiography as a 
form of poetic memory. In another context, Mao described the high posturing of imperialism as a mere 
“paper tiger” (紙老虎). For this essay, against the paper tiger of the limits of imagined communities, I have 
formed a chain of equivalence between the historical and current rural struggles in Corsica and Heyang. 
The creative link, achieved through a tiger’s leap between the peculiarities of Corsica and Heyang, 
showcases an alternative heritage predicated not on established cultural categories but on the experience 
of contested rural struggles. Despite their respective celebratory cultural narratives, underlying struggles 
over historic and contemporary displacement ground an alternative to the depoliticized visions of universal 
heritage promoted within the World Heritage Order. In relation to its monopoly over the standardization of 
universal cultural heritage under the language of capital(s), perhaps the only response, as a “weapon of 
the weak” (see Scott, 1985), is to connect the “dialects” of countrysides. 
 
Looking for alternatives, with the PRC’s long-standing promotion of “red heritage” tourism and 
given rhetoric that its communist heritage is under threat by “foreign values,” exemplified by then 
president Hu’s (2012) essay whereby Western cultural and ideological fields represent the battleground for 
China to promote socialism, it is possible that the country may ironically be forced to list International 
Communism on the Intangible Cultural World Heritage list, a list where UNESCO (2003) recognizes the 
“processes of globalization” as threatening the “disappearance and destruction of the intangible cultural 
heritage, in particular owing to a lack of resources for safeguarding such heritage.” Perhaps only then 
would there be the required protection and funding to radically rewire and reimagine the communication 
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